Script Kiddies Beware: The Long
Arm of U.S. Jurisdiction to Prescribe by Eisinger, John
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 59 | Issue 4 Article 13
Fall 9-1-2002
Script Kiddies Beware: The Long Arm of U.S.
Jurisdiction to Prescribe
John Eisinger
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Computer Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
John Eisinger, Script Kiddies Beware: The Long Arm of U.S. Jurisdiction to Prescribe, 59 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 1507 (2002), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol59/iss4/13
Script Kiddies Beware: The Long
Arm of U.S. Jurisdiction to Prescribe
John Eisinger*
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ...................................... 1508
II. General Principles of International Law ................. 1512
III. Jurisdiction to Prescribe ............................. 1514
A. The Effects Principle ........................... 1516
1. Legitimacy of the Effects Principle .............. 1516
2. Applying the Effects Principle to Computer Viruses . 1523
B. The Protective Principle ......................... 1524
1. Legitimacy of the Protective Principle ............ 1524
2. Applying the Protective Principle to Computer
V iruses ................................... 1528
C. Passive Personality ............................. 1529
1. Legitimacy of Passive Personality ............... 1529
2. Applying Passive Personality to Computer Viruses .. 1531
D. Universal Jurisdiction ........................... 1533
1. Legitimacy of Universal Jurisdiction ............. 1533
2. Applying Universal Jurisdiction to Computer Viruses 1536
E. Sum m ary .................................... 1536
IV. Applying the Computer Crime Statute Extraterritorially ..... 1537
A. Reasonableness and Comity ...................... 1537
B. Applying the 1994 Act Extraterritorially ............. 1541
V . Conclusion ...................................... 1544
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, May 2003, Washington and Lee University School of
Law. The author wishes to thank his parents and sister for their never-ending support and
encouragement, Rebecca Miles for her editorial assistance, and Professor Frederic Kirgis for
his advice and guidance.
1507
1508 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1507 (2002)
I. Introduction
On Friday, March 26, 1999, a computer virus shut down computer
networks across the United States and around the world.' The virus, dubbed
"W97M.Melissa.A" by the anti-virus industry and "Melissa" by the media,
came in the form of an E-mail attachment written in Visual Basic Script
(VBS).2 When opened, the virus executed a string of commands and E-mailed
itself to the first 50 people in the user's Microsoft Outlook address book.'
The virus set off a chain reaction that flooded the E-mail systems of many
large companies and forced them to shut down their Internet gateways and
mail systems.4 Not since university student Robert Morris released the
"Internet Worm" in 1988' had the Internet been so paralyzed by a program
gone awry.6 Within a week, nearly two dozen copycat versions of Melissa
infected computers on the Internet.7
On Thursday, May 4, 2000, a computer virus shut down computer
networks across the United States and around the world.' The virus, dubbed
"VBS.Love Letter" by the anti-virus industry and the "iloveyou" virus by the
1. See David Kocieniewski, Man Is Charged in the Creation of E-Mail Virus, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 3, 1999, at Al (mentioning huge volume of E-mail that forced many firms to shut
down computer networks).
2. See Raul K. Elnitiarta, Security Update: W97M.Melissa.A, at http://securityresponse.
ymantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/mailissa.html (March 29, 1999) (documenting technical
description of Melissa virus).
3. See id. (explaining how Melissa propagated).
4. See Kocieniewski, supra note 1, at Al (explaining that "[bly replicating and sending
itself so rapidly, the virus clogged and in some cases incapacitated computer networks at about
300 corporations"); Chris Taylor, How They Caught Him: Tracking the Hacker Who Hatched
the Melissa Virus, TIME, Apr. 12, 1999, at 66 (stating that Melissa virus "caus[ed] shutdowns
in more than 300 computer networks").
5. See CLFF STOLL, THE CucKoo's EG 335-47 (1989) (detailing how worm spread and
how it affected computers).
6. See Steven Levy, Biting Back at the Wily Melissa, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 12, 1999, at 62
(stating that "[n]ot since the Internet Worm of 1988 has a virus writer been pursued with such
fury").
7. See Taylor, supra note 4, at 66 (stating that Melissa's "freely available source code
soon spawned copycat viruses"); see also Elnitiarta, supra note 2 (listing several variants which
showed up within days of Melissa's release).
8. See Mark Landler,A Filipino Linked to 'Love Bug' Talks About His License to Hack,
N.Y. TIM, Oct. 21, 2000, at C1 (explaining effects of iloveyou on computer systems around
world).
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media, typically came in the form of an E-mail attachment written in VBS.9
When opened, the virus executed a string of commands that deleted files,
infected Internet Relay Chat (IRC), attempted to steal passwords, and E-
mailed a copy of the virus to everyone in the user's Microsoft Outlook address
book.1" The virus set off a chain reaction that flooded the E-mail systems of
many large companies and forced them to shut down their Internet gateways
and mail systems." Within a year, over eighty variants of the iloveyou virus
existed.12
Although these two virus outbreaks seem quite similar, the legal conse-
quences for the two men who authored and distributed the viruses were very
different.' 3 Authorities arrested New Jersey resident David Smith, the creator
and distributor of Melissa, within a week of Melissa's release and charged him
with interruption of public communications, conspiracy, theft of computer
service, and wrongful access to computer systems.'4 He faced forty years in
prison and $480,000 in fines. 5 Smith pleaded guilty to a violation of the
computer fraud statute and admitted causing damages in excess of $80
million. 6
The Philippine government could not directly charge Manila, Philippines
resident Onel de Guzman for his role in creating and distributing the iloveyou
virus because the Philippines criminal code did not prohibit computer
crimes. 7 Instead, the government charged de Guzman with the traditional
9. See Eric Chien & Brian Ewell, Security Response: VBS.Love Letter and Variants, at
http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/vbs.loveletter.a.html (last modified
May 31, 2001) (documenting technical description of iloveyou virus).
10. See id. (detailing properties of iloveyou virus).
11. See Landler, supra note 8, at C1 (claiming iloveyou "paralyzed computers from the
Pentagon to the British Parliament" as it moved from Asia to United States and Europe).
12. See Chien & Ewell, supra note 9 (listing eighty-two variants of iloveyou virus
discovered as of May 2001).
13. See infra notes 14-19 and accompanying text (explaining that distributor of Melissa
faced computer crime charges in United States, but distributor of iloveyou did not).
14. See Matt Ackermann, Prosecuting Melissa': Catching David Smith Was the Easy
Part. Now What Do Cyberlaw Enforcers Do with Him? 156 N.J.L.J. 89 (1999) (detailing
charges against Smith).
15. See id. (explaining that "Smith could face as much as 40 years in prison and a
$480,000 fine if convicted on all charges"). Three years after releasing Melissa, the court
sentenced Smith to twenty months in prison, one hundred hours of community service, three
years of supervised release, and a $5,000 fine. John Soat, IT Confidential, INFO. WEEK, May
6,2002, at 120.
16. See Robert Moskowitz, Crime andPunishment, NETWoRK COMPUTING, Feb. 7,2000,
at 37 (stating that "[o]n December 9, 1999, David Smith pleaded guilty to causing more than
$80 million worth of damage when he released his Melissa virus on the Internet").
17. See Landler, supra note 8, at Cl (stating that "[t]he case against [de Guzman] was
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crimes of theft and credit card fraud in connection with the virus."8 However,
in August 2000, the Philippine government dropped all charges due to a lack
of evidence of a non-computer crime.' 9 The virus caused worldwide damages
estimated at $10 billion.2"
The primary federal computer crime statute, the Computer Abuse Amend-
ments Act of 199421 (1994 Act), makes it illegal to damage data on a
computer,22 defraud others,23 or steal information electronically.24 However,
Smith's virus did very little real damage to files; Melissa only infected docu-
ments and occasionally added some text to infected documents.2" In addition,
the Melissa virus did not attempt to defraud people or steal information. 6
Moreover, Smith attempted to limit the spread of Melissa by only sending E-
mail to "the first 50 entries out of the address books... [and by] only running
once per system boot."2 '
Unlike Smith, de Guzman intentionally caused damage and destroyed
files. 2' He used his virus in an attempt to defraud people and steal passwords. 9
While Smith evinced surprise at the rapid spread of Melissa,30 de Guzman used
weakened because at the time, the Philippines did not have laws governing computer espio-
nage").
18. See id. (commenting that "[tihe Philippine authorities filed theft and other charges
against Mr. [die Guzman").
19. See id. (explaining that Philippine authorities "dropped [the charges] in August
because of insufficient evidence").
20. See id. (stating that iloveyou virus caused "an estimated $10 billion in damage").
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994).
22. See id § 1030(aX5), (7) (barring unauthorized access that results in damage).
23. See id. § 1030(aX4), (6) (prohibiting computer fraud).
24. See id. § 1030(a)(1), (2) (criminalizing theft of information).
25. See Elnitiarta, supra note 2 (stating that Melissa added text to infected document if
user opened document "at the number of minutes past the hour corresponding to the date (i.e.,
on the 16th of the month, the payload triggers at 16 minutes after every hour)").
26. See id. (explaining process by which Melissa attempted to replicate itself, but making
no mention of fraud or theft).
27. Moskowitz, supra note 16, at 37.
28. See Chien & Ewell, supra note 9 (stating that iloveyou overwrote some two dozen file
formats, including music and image files, and replaced them with virus).
29. See id. (detailing actions of iloveyou, which include trying to "download a password-
stealing Trojan horse program from a Web site"); Computer Virus Charges Sought, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 2000, at C5 (claiming that iloveyou stole passwords and sent them to E-mail addresses
in Philippines); Landler, supra note 8, at CI (explaining that de Guzman's college thesis
described "method for stealing passwords to gain free access to the Internet" and that he
possibly released iloveyou to prove thesis).
30. See Moskowitz, supra note 16, at 37 (noting Smith's attempts to limit spread of virs
and his claim that he did not intend rapid distribution of virus).
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the same method for spreading his virus and therefore cannot claim ignorance
of the potential worldwide distribution of iloveyou."
Why did Smith face forty years in prison while de Guzman was not even
charged with a crime in the United States? It appears that de Guzman went
out of his way to create a virus that could rapidly propagate itself around the
world and that would damage, defraud, and steal. 2 Why did de Guzman get
away without charges in the United States, whereas Smith was charged and
convicted for a much less damaging virus? The answer to this question lies
in international law concepts that restrict the jurisdiction of states based on the
nationality and residence of the person who commits the crime.33
This Note examines how the United States can use its jurisdiction to
prescribe laws in order to prohibit foreign nationals from releasing viruses that
affect domestic computers, even if their actions occur on foreign soil. Part II
of this Note outlines the basic tenets of international law, including the
sources from which international law derives. 4 Part III discusses various
methods by which the United States can exert jurisdiction to prescribe its laws
extraterritorially.3" Those methods include the effects principle,3" the protec-
tive principle," passive personality," and universal jurisdiction.39 Part IV
examines the reasonableness of exerting jurisdiction in computer virus cases
40
and whether or not Congress meant the 1994 Act to apply extraterritorially. 1
31. Compare Chien & Ewell, supra note 9 (explaining that iloveyou sends E-mail to
everyone in user's address book, infects files on servers that others access, and also replicates
using Internet Relay Chat) with Elnitiarta, supra note 2 (showing that thirteen months before
iloveyou, Melissa spread rapidly by sending to only first fifty users in address book).
32. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text (detailing destructive nature of
iloveyou virus).
33. See infra notes 70-74 and accompanying text (explaining nationality and territoriality
principles).
34. See infra Part 11 (outlining sources of international law).
35. See infra Part m (noting bases ofjurisdiction to prescribe).
36. See infra Part MA (explaining how effects principle allows states to prescribe laws
extraterritorially).
37. See infra Part M13.B (detailing state's right to protect state interests from harm).
38. See infra Part m.C (describing state's right to protect its citizens from being targeted
based on their nationality).
39. See infra Part I.D (explaining how certain universally condemned crimes create
jurisdiction in every state).
40. See infra Part IV.A (justifying United States exercise of jurisdiction in computer virus
cases under international comity).
41. See infra Part IV.B (arguing that Congress intended 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994) to
operate extraterritorially).
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This Note concludes that the effects principle allows the United States to
prescribe laws against releasing viruses that substantially affect U.S. comput-
ers.42 Furthermore, the protective principle is applicable in cases in which a
computer virus specifically targets the U.S. government.43 However, because
passive personality is not as well recognized, it may provide additional justifi-
cation for jurisdiction, but rarely would justify jurisdiction by itself.4 Al-
though universal jurisdiction enjoys wide acceptance, it does not cover com-
puter viruses and therefore is not applicable.45 In addition to having jurisdic-
tion, it is reasonable for the United States to exert its jurisdiction in cases in
which a virus substantially affects the United States or targets the United
States government, and in which the country of the virus's origin is unable to
prosecute.' Finally, this Note concludes that Congress intended the 1994 Act
to apply extraterritorially.47
II. General Principles of International Law
Under international law, a state must have the jurisdiction to prescribe,
adjudicate, and enforce its laws before convicting a person of a criminal
offense.4 This Note examines only the jurisdiction to prescribe, which many
scholars refer to as the jurisdiction to legislate.49 It is important to understand
the implications of the jurisdiction to prescribe because this principle allows
the United States to prescribe laws prohibiting the activities of the
perpetrator, s° but it does not assist the United States in bringing the perpetra-
42. See infra notes 141-49 and accompanying text (explaining how effects principle
applies to computer viruses).
43. See infra text accompanying notes 184-94 (noting how computer viruses can invoke
protective principle).
44. See infra notes 220-34 and accompanying text (maintaining that passive personality
is not well suited for computer viruses).
45. See infra notes 257-60 and accompanying text (concluding that computer viruses do
not implicate peremptory norms and thus do not justify universal jurisdiction).
46. See infra notes 307-09 and accompanying text (determining that extraterritorial
jurisdiction does not offend international comity in computer virus cases).
47. See infra notes 330-31 and accompanying text (arguing that Congress intended 18
U.S.C. § 1030 (1994) to apply extraterritorially).
48. See Darrel C. Menthe, Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: A Theory oflnternational Spaces,
4 MICH. TEE COMM. TECH. L. REv. 69, 71 (1998) (explaining different types ofjurisdiction in
international law).
49. See IAN BROWNL1E, PRINCIPLES OF PUBuC INTERNATIONAL LAW 298 (4th ed. 1990)
(noting that prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction describes state's authority to make rules and
decisions).
50. See I SIR ROBERT JENNINGS & SIR ARTHUR WATrs, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL
LAW 456 (9th ed. 1992) (stating that legislative jurisdiction regulates conduct).
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tor into a U.S. court."' If the perpetrator's activities occur in another state, the
United States will need to convince that state to extradite the perpetrator, or
the United States will have to lure or abduct the perpetrator.52 However, if the
United States does not have an internationally recognized basis for jurisdic-
tion, other states will be unwilling to support extradition or a trial in the
United States.53
International law primarily consists of the practices and opinions of states
as evidenced by treaties and custom.54 Treaties include everything from
agreements between two states to conventions with over one hundred signatory
nations." Custom is a combination of widespread state practice over time and
opiniojuris.56 Because no treaty specifies which particular bases ofjurisdic-
tion are available to states, this Note deals primarily with customary interna-
tional law.5"
Custom requires consistent, widespread state practice over time.5"
Evidence of widespread state practice includes treaties, statutes, court deci-
sions, statements of state representatives, and treatises.59 However, the amount
of weight given to each source depends on the type and scope of the custom.' °
51. See id. at 463 (requiring physical presence of defendant in order to prosecute).
52. See generally BROWN.E, supra note 49 (noting need to bring accused before tribunal
in order to exert adjudicative jurisdiction).
53. Cf infra note 136 and accompanying text (noting that extradition proceedings in
United Kingdom verify foreign state's jurisdiction before allowing extradition).
54. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38 (1), 59 Stat.
1055 (listing sources of international law applied by International Court of Justice, including
international conventions, custom, general principles of law, and legal treatises). "Article 38
is generally regarded as a complete statement of the sources of international law." BROWNIE,
supra note 49, at 3. Of the four sources, "custom and treaties... are the principal and regular
sources of international law." JENNINGS & WATrS, supra note 50, at 24.
55. See JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 50, at 32 (noting that "all treaties, whether
bilateral or multilateral," provide evidence of international law).
56. See BROWNIE, supra note 49, at 5-7 (detailing elements of custom); infra note 62 and
accompanying text (explaining opiniojuris).
57. Treaties are agreements between states or groups of states. See generally JENNINGS
& WARTrs, supra note 50, at 32 (discussing international treaties). International law dictates that
states that freely consent to be bound by a treaty must live up to their agreement. See id. (noting
binding nature of treaties). These agreements are the international form of a domestic contract
that binds states to each other. See id. at 1224 (explaining that treaties are contracts). Normally,
a treaty does not bind states that are not parties to the treaty. See BROWNLUE, supra note 49, at
12 (discussing binding effect of treaties).
58. See BROWNLE, supra note 49, at 5 (explaining elements of international custom).
59. See id. (listing sources of custom).
60. See id. (noting that "the value of these sources varies and much depends on the
circumstances").
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This Note relies primarily on court decisions, although it also references
statutes and treaties.
In addition to widespread state practice, custom requires opinio jurs.
61
Opinio juris is the concept that states act in a way that suggests that they
believe themselves to be bound by a customary rule.62 If a U.S. court rules
against the interests of the United States and cites customary international law,
the decision is strongly indicative of opinio jurs.63 While custom requires a
finding of opinio juris, the International Court of Justice frequently assumes
opiniojuris when evidence of general practice is present.'
A final source of international law is jus cogens, or peremptory norms,
which override both treaties and custom.65 Peremptory norms are universally
accepted principles that are so central to the functioning of civilized states that
countries cannot opt out of them." For example, there is a peremptory norm
against slavery,6' thus evidence of thousands of years of slavery and treaties
that support slavery do not allow a state to practice slavery." This Note
addresses peremptory norms in subpart IID, which deals with universal
jurisdiction.69
III. Jurisdiction to Prescribe
Several different principles under international law allow a state to
prescribe laws.7" The most widely used principles are territoriality7 and
61. See id. at 7 (noting use of opiniojuris in determining custom).
62. See id. (explaining concept of opiniojuris).
63. It is normally in the best interests of a court to rule in a manner that supports the
sovereign that gives the court power. See JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 50, at 457 (noting
that "courts naturally tend to see the problems which arise primarily from the point of view of
the interests of their own state"). Therefore, if a court rules against its sovereign, then the ruling
is persuasive evidence that the state believes that it is bound by a customary rule.
64. See BROWNLIE, supra note 49, at 7 (discussing approach of International Court of
Justice toward custom).
65. See id. at 513 (stating thatjus cogens "are rules of customary international law which
cannot be set aside by treaty or acquiescence").
66. See JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 50, at 7-8 (defining scope of peremptory norms).
67. See id. at 8 (noting that peremptory norm prohibits slavery).
68. See supra note 65 (maintaining that custom and treaties cannot trump peremptory
norms).
69. See infra Part, ll.D (explaining relationship between peremptory norms and universal
jurisdiction).
70. See infra notes 71-72, 79-82 and accompanying text (listing different forms of
jurisdiction).
71. See JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 50, at 458 (stating that "[tierritoriality is the
primary basis for jurisdiction").
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nationality. 2 The principle of territoriality, or more specifically subjective
territoriality, grants a state the jurisdiction to prescribe laws that regulate the
conduct of persons whose acts occur within that state." The principle of
nationality allows a state to prescribe laws that regulate the conduct of the
state's citizens regardless of where their actions occur." However, as evi-
denced by the iloveyou virus, the Internet enables foreign nationals to commit
acts in foreign countries that affect computers in the United States in contra-
vention of U.S. laws." Neither the principle of subjective territoriality nor the
principle of nationality permitted the United States to exert jurisdiction over
Onel de Guzman because he was a citizen of the Philippines" and his actions
occurred in the Philippines."
However, international law provides several other principles on which a
country may base the jurisdiction to prescribe.7" These principles include the
effects principle,79 the protective principle,"' passive personality,8" and univer-
sal jurisdiction. 2 This Part examines these principles of extraterritorial
72. See id. at 462-63 (noting divergent views on use of nationality principle).
73. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(1)(a) (1987) (asserting that "a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its territory").
74. See id. at § 402(2Xa) (stating that "a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with
respect to the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within
its territory").
75. See supra notes 8-12, 20, and accompanying text (outlining damage iloveyou virus
caused worldwide).
76. See Landler, supra note 8, at CI (stating that de Guzman is Filipino).
77. See id. (identifying source of virus as Manila, Philippines).
78. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text (listing other bases of jurisdiction to
prescribe).
79. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402(1)(c) (1987) (stating that "a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to conduct
outside its teiritory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory").
80. See id. § 402(3) (asserting that "a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect
to certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the
security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests").
81. See id. § 402 cmt g ("The passive personality principle asserts that a state may apply
law - particularly criminal law - to an act committed outside its territory by a person not its
national where the victim of the act was its national. The principle has not been generally
accepted for ordinary torts or crimes, but it is increasingly accepted as applied to terrorist and
other organized attacks on a state's nationals by reason of their nationality.").
82. See id. at § 404 (stating that "a state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punish-
ment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern").
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jurisdiction and analyzes how a country can use them to criminalize the actions
of foreign virus distributors. 3
A. The Effects Principle
Many scholars consider the effects principle, which is often referred to as
objective territoriality, 4 to be a subset of territoriality. 5 The effects principle
allows a state to "prescribe law with respect to conduct outside its territory that
has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory.""6 The classic
illustration of this principle is a case in which someone in France shoots
someone on the German side of the Franco-German border.8 ' Germany can
exert jurisdiction in this case because there was a substantial effect in Ger-
many, even though the act took place in France. 8
1. Legitimacy of the Effects Principle
SS. Lotus 9 is one of the earliest cases to use the effects principle.' In
S.S. Lotus, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) addressed a
collision between the French ship Lotus and the Turkish vessel Boz-Kourt.9'
83. See infra Parts MliA-C (explaining how effects principle, protective principle and
passive personality can aid state in exerting jurisdiction over computer offenses).
84. See Sanjay S. Mody, National Cyberspace Regulation: Unbundling the Concept of
Jurisdiction, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 365, 375 (2001) (referring to effects principle as objective
territoriality).
85. See RESTATEaMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402
cmt. d (1987) (explaining that effects principle "is an aspect of jurisdiction based on
territoriality, although it is sometimes viewed as a distinct category").
86. Id. § 402(lXc).
87. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 37 (Sept. 7, 1927) (Loder,
J., dissenting).
88. See id. (Loder, J., dissenting) (noting that act and consequences are indistinguishable
and that direct relationship justifies applying legal fiction).
89. (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7, 1927).
90. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (set. A) No. 9, at 30-32 (Sept. 7, 1927)
(holding that Turkish trial of French citizen for actions committed on French territory did not
conflict with international law because effects of action were felt in Turkish territory). In S.S.
Lotus, the PCU reviewed the claims of France and Turkey concerning Turkey's right to exert
jurisdiction over a French officer (Lieutenant Demons) who committed negligent acts aboard
a French ship. Id. at 10-11. The Court determined that the effect of the French officer's
negligence aboard the Lotus, which the Turkish court found and France did not dispute, resulted
in the collision with, and sinking of, the Turkish vessel Boz-Kourt, and the subsequent death
of eight Turkish nationals. Id. at 30-32. The PCUI concluded that no principle of international
law precluded Turkey from instituting criminal proceedings. Id. at 31.
91. See id. at 10 (detailing collision between Lotus and Boz-Kourt).
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As a result of the collision, the Boz-Kourt sank and eight Turkish nationals
drowned.' When the Lotus arrived in Constantinople, Turkish authorities
arrested the captain of the Turkish vessel, Hassan Bey, and the French officer
of the watch at the time of the collision, Lieutenant Demons.93 The prosecutor
charged both men with manslaughter.94 Lieutenant Demons objected to his
detention and thal on the ground that Turkey lacked jurisdiction.95 Both
France and Turkey agreed that under international law ships are floating
pieces of territory of the country under whose flag they sail.96
The PCIJ found that Turkey had jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce its
laws on a French citizen whose actions occurred on French territory because
the effect of his actions was felt on Turkish territory.9' In addition, J.B.
Moore, the American judge, agreed with all of the majority's conclusions on
the use of the effects principle in this case, but dissented because he thought
that the Turkish law in question violated international law in other respects."
However, Judge Loder's dissent characterized the majority's decision as-
expanding the scope of the established effects principle from cases involving
intentional harm to cases involving only negligence." Thus, Judge Loder
implied that if the Lotus intentionally rammed the Boz-Kourt, Turkey would
have jurisdiction, but he thought that the Court should not extend this principle
to negligent acts."sc While the official vote was six to six with the President
92. Id.
93. See id. at 10-11 (detailing facts of case).
94. See id. at 11 (explaining charges against officers).
95. See id. (detailing Lieutenant Demons's objections to his arrest).
96. See id. at 25 (stating that "a ship on the high seas is assimilated to the territory of the
state the flag of which it flies").
97. See id. at 30-31 (explaining that Lieutenant Demons's actions aboard Lotus caused
effects aboard Boz-Kourt and exclusive jurisdiction of either state would fail to "satisfy the
requirements of justice and effectively... protect the interests of the two States," so concurrent
jurisdiction was required).
98. See id. at 65 (Moore, J., dissenting) (concurring with "judgment of the Court that
there is no rule of international law by virtue of which the penal cognizance of a collision at
sea... belongs exclusively to the country of the ship by or by means of which the wrong was
done").
99. See id. at 37 (Loder, J., dissenting) (maintaining that jurisdiction to prescribe is proper
in case in which "the author of the crime intends ... to inflict injury at a place other than that
where he himself is"). However, in this case "officer of the Lotus :. . had no intention of
injuring anyone, and no such intention is imputed to him." Id. (Loder, J., dissenting).
100. See id. (Loder, J., dissenting) (asserting that effects principle is "justified where the
act and its effect are indistinguishable... for instance a shot fired at a person on the other side
of a frontier").
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casting a second vote to break the tie,' in reality, eight of the twelve judges
agreed that the effects principle operates if the intent to harm is present."°
Additionally, seven of the twelve believed that the effects principle was valid
with or without an intent to harm.' °3
In addition to the PCIJ and its successor, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), courts around the world have embraced the effects principle as a valid
method for exerting the jurisdiction to prescribe."° For instance, in an anti-
trust case, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California,' the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized the effects principle."° Furthermore, the European Commis-
sion held that member states have jurisdiction under their competition laws in
cases that affect commerce between member nations regardless of the locus of
the offense."° Similarly, "[mjost other states of Western Europe, including
Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden
and Switzerland, as well as Canada and Japan ... have accepted the effects
doctrine as applied to economic effects."' 8
While the preceding cases recognize the effects principle for economic
effects, the effects principle has its roots in a criminal case,"° and numerous
101. See id. at 32 (explaining that President, i.e. Chief Judge, cast second vote, "the votes
being equally divided").
102. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (noting Judge Loder's view on
validity of effects principle).
103. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (stating that Judge Moore accepted effects
principle).
104. See mfra notes 105-39 and accompanying text (citing international cases using effects
principle).
105. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
106. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (stating that "it is well
established by now that the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce
and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States"). In Harford, the Court
heard arguments from domestic and foreign reinsurance companies that the United States had
charged with violations of U.S. antitrust laws. Id. at 769. The reinsurance companies claimed
that "the principle of international comity requires the District Court to refrain from exercising
jurisdiction over" foreign insurers. Id. The Court disagreed with the defendant reinsurance
companies, holding that the foreign defendants "engagedin unlawful conspiracies to affect the
market for insurance in the United States and that their conduct in fact produced substantial
effect." Id. at 796.
107. See Aniline Dyes, 1969 O.J. (L 195) 11, 25 1969 C.M.L.R. D 23, D 33 (1969)
(determining that European Commission has jurisdiction over undertakings "whether they are
based inside or outside the Common Market ... that are liable to affect commerce between
Member States and which have for their object, or their effect, the result of stopping, restraining
or distorting free competition within the Common Market").
108. RBsTATEMENT (THRD) FOREIoN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403 cmt.
n.3 (1987).
109. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text (detailing birth of effects principle in
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courts continue to apply it to criminal cases. 1" Examples in the United States
include United States v. Thomas,' a domestic case in which all of the activi-
ties and parties were in the United States, and Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v.
Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc.,"' an international case involving activities in
Italy and an Italian defendant." 3 Both cases address electronic activity."4
In Thomas, the court found proper venue in the Western District of
Tennessee, although all of the defendants' activities occurred in California." 5
The defendants in Thomas operated a bulletin board in California that allowed
users, for a fee, to dial in and download pornographic images or order porno-
S.S. Lotus).
110. See infra notes 111-39 and accompanying text (outlining cases using effects principle
in courts around world).
111. 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
112. 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
113. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996) (establishing that effects
principle is valid for venue determination in pornography case); see also Playboy Enters., Inc.
v. Chuckleberry Publ'g, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that United States
has jurisdiction over Italian website to extent that it is viewable in United States).
In Thomas, the defendants operated a bulletin board in California that featured porno-
graphic images and movies. Thomas, 74 F.3d at 705. A federal grand jury indicted the
defendants for numerous federal obscenity and child pornography offenses in the Western
District of Tennessee stemming from their operation of the bulletin board and for mailing
pornographic video tapes. Id. at 705-06. The court determined that venue was proper in
Tennessee because, although the defendants conducted their business in California, "the effects
of the Defendants' criminal conduct reached the Western District of Tennessee." Id. at 710.
The court also determined that the charges under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462 and 1465 (obscenity laws)
were proper because the pictures in question were intangible, electronic images and it was the
intent of Congress to "legislate comprehensively the interstate distribution of obscene materi-
als." Id. at 707-09.
The defendant in Chuckleberry published Playmen magazine in Italy, fifteen years earlier,
the same court had enjoined the defendant from distributing an English language version of the
magazine in the United States in contravention of the Playboy Enterprises, Inc. (Playboy)
trademark. Chuckiebery, 939 F. Supp. at 1033-34. The defendant created an Internet site and
began distributing Playmen from the Internet site. Id. at 1034-35. The defendant contended
that the injunction did not contemplate Internet distribution of pictures and magazines and that
therefore the court could not expand the injunction to cover Internet distribution of the maga-
zine and images. Id. at 1036. The Chuckleberry court felt that the fact that the parties could
not have contemplated dissemination over the Internet was irrelevant to the purpose behind the
injunction. Id. at 1037. The court held that "[w]hile this Court has neither the jurisdiction nor
the desire to prohibit creation of Internet sites around the globe, it may prohibit access to those
sites in this country." Id. at 1040. -
114. See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 704 (describing defendants' computer bulletin board);
Chuckleberry, 939 F. Supp. at 1034-35 (detailing services on defendant's Internet website).
115. See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 710 (stating that defendant had contact with subscriber in
Tennessee and that subscriber had defendant's permission to download images to Tennessee).
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graphic videotapes." 6 The court used the effects principle to justify venue by
suggesting that Tennessee felt the effects of the defendants' actions and that
the defendants also consented to the downloading of the images in Tennes-
see."' Although Thomas is a domestic case, its reasoning parallels the effects
principle under international law."'
The district court in Chuckleberry determined that the United States could
regulate foreign websites to the extent that users in the United States accessed
the sites." 9 In 1981, the plaintiff, Playboy Enterprises, Inc. (Playboy), ob-
tained an injunction against the sale and distribution of the Italian magazine
Playmen in the United States. 2 ' Fifteen years later, the defendant in
Chuckleberry, who published Playmen, created a website and charged a
membership fee for viewing images from the magazine.12' Playboy filed suit
in New York alleging that the publisher of Playmen acted in contempt of the
1981 injunction by distributing Playmen magazine over the Internet."22 The
district court agreed with Playboy and ordered the defendant to shut down its
website or to ensure that no customers from the United States accessed the
site."' Although the court did not specifically mention the effects principle,
it stated that the United States has the authority to force a foreign business that
operates in a foreign country to prohibit customers in the United States from
accessing its website.'24 In addition to Thomas and Chuckleberry, numerous
other U.S. cases have involved the effects principle."
116. See id. at 705 (explaining how defendants operated their Amateur Action Computer
Bulletin Board System (AABSS)).
117. See id. at 709-10 (noting that "AABBS materials were distributed to an approved
AABBS member known to reside in the Western District of Tennessee"). In addition, the court
determined that the proper community standard for the Miller (Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15 (1973)) obscenity test was Tennessee. Id. at 711.
118. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text (explaining effects principle in
international law).
119. See Chuckleberry, 939 F. Supp. at 1040 (outlining court's jurisdiction in light of
existing injunction).
120. See id. at 1034 (detailing previous injunction against publisher of Playmen).
121. See id. at 1034-35 (outlining services available on Playmen Internet site).
122. See id. at 1033 (stating cause of action in case).
123. See id. at 1041 (holding that defendant must "either shutdown [sic] its Internet site
completely or refrain from accepting any new subscriptions from customers residing in the
United States [and] invalidate the user names and passwords to the Internet site previously
purchased by United States customers").
124. See id. at 1039-40 (stating that worldwide Internet community's right to freedom of
speech does not override court orders and injunctions prohibiting foreign entity from distribut-
ing banned material to United States).
125. See, e.g., United States v. Best, No. 01-4321,2002 WL 31080306, at * (3d Cir. Sept.
18, 2002) (stating that United States had jurisdiction over offense of smuggling aliens into
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Other countries have recognized the right of a state to prescribe laws
against the activities of aliens who operate in foreign countries if the prescrib-
ing state feels the effects of the aliens' activities.126 The most notable Cana-
dian case is Libman v. The Queen127 because it extensively discusses Canadian
and British law dealing with the effects principle. 2 " In Libman, the Canadian
Supreme Court determined that Canada could prosecute a Canadian citizen
who acted in Canada for a telemarketing fraud committed against U.S. citizens
in the United States. 29 Although this case seems to follow the nationality
principle, in fact the Court used the effects principle to justify the decision. 30
The defendant argued that Canada lacked jurisdiction to prescribe because the
victims resided in the United States and the money from the scheme was
neither sent from nor received in Canada and thus the gravamen of the crime
occurred abroad.13 1 The Court traced English law on multi-jurisdictional
crimes and determined that it was appropriate to find jurisdiction over "activi-
United States, even if actions in pursuit of smuggling are taken abroad); United States v.
Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1994) (using effects principle to obtain jurisdiction
over suspect accused of murdering two American tourists in Mexico); United States v. Felix-
Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1991) (utilizing effects principle in case of murder and
kidnapping of DEA agent in Mexico); United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.
1986) (holding that United States can prescribe laws that regulate drug smuggling
extraterritorially); United States v. bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding that
defendant's actions in bombing of U.S. embassies fell under U.S. jurisdiction to prescribe).
126. See infra notes 127-39 and accompanying text (noting decisions in Canada and United
Kingdom).
127. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178.
128. See Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178 (holding that Canada had jurisdiction
over defendant for actions committed in United States). The defendant in Libman ran a
telemarketing scheme in Canada that defrauded citizens of the United States. Id. at 181. The
Court discussed the history of decisions in the United Kingdom and Canada pertaining to
offenses that were conducted in multiple jurisdictions. Id. at 183-207. The Court indicated that
a line of English cases pointed to a determination that multiple states could exert jurisdiction
over a multinational crime. Id. at 187-99. The Court determined that the country in which the
perpetrator committed the crime and the country in which the victims felt the effects could both
exert the jurisdiction to prescribe an offense. Id. at 212-13. The Court adopted the position that
Canada can prescribe laws in cases in which there is "'a real and substantial link' between an
offence and this country." Id. at 213. The Court determined that Canada "has a legitimate
interest in prosecuting persons for activities that take place abroad but have unlawful conse-
quences" in Canada. Id. at 209. The Court held that, for Canada to exert jurisdiction, "a
significant portion of the activities constituting that offence [must take] place in Canada" and
there should be a "real and substantial link" between Canada and the offense. Id. at 213.
129. See id. at 181-82 (outlining defendant's operation).
130. See infra note 132 and accompanying text (explaining use of effects principle).
131. See Libman, 2 S.C.R. at 182-83 (detailing defense's arguments).
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ties that take place abroad but have an unlawful consequence here."'32 Other
Canadian courts have followed the "continued offence" 133 reasoning of
Libman and used the effects principle to allow jurisdiction if Canada feels a
substantial impact from actions taken abroad.1
34
The English courts also use the effects principle either to exert jurisdic-
tion over foreigners135 or to allow foreign jurisdiction over actions that occur
in Great Britain. 36 In addition, the purpose of the earlier territorial restric-
tions on jurisdiction to prescribe that Judge La Forest summarized in Libman
no longer applies with the same force that it did before communication
technologies made international transactions cheap, fast, and reliable. 37 The
impact of actions taken abroad affects domestic businesses;, 3S thus, a state has
an obligation to protect its citizens and businesses from crimes initiated
abroad.
39
132. Id. at 209. The Court determined that because the proceeds of the fraudulent scheme
ended up in Canada, Canada felt the effects of the scheme. Id. at 211.
133. See id. at 196-99 (explaining that "continuing offence" refers to crime with elements
that occur in multiple jurisdictions and that are punishable in all jurisdictions in which substan-
tial portion of crime was committed).
134. See, e.g., Cook v. The Queen, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597 (invalidating testimony obtained
in United States by Canadian police who failed to properly explain rights to defendant); R. v.
Greco, [2001] 159 C.C.C. (3d) 146 (allowing prosecution of Canadian citizen who violated
conditions of parole while abroad).
135. See Trade v. Markus, [1976] A.C. 35 (giving English law jurisdiction over "interna-
tional swindle" because effect of crime was felt in England); R. v. Wall, [1974] 1 W.L.R. 930
(Eng. CA.) (holding that acts committed abroad that resulted in importation of drugs into
England were subject to English law); Director of Public Prosecutions v. Doot, [1973] A.C. 807
(same); R. v. Baxter, [19721 1 Q.B. I (exerting jurisdiction over resident of Northern Ireland
for mail fraud affecting English citizens).
136. See Treacy v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1971] A.C. 537 (stating that appellant
could be tried in Germany for blackmail initiated from England); King v. Godfrey, [1923] 1
K.B. 24 (holding that English citizen could be extradited to Switzerland for involvement in
crime committed in Switzerland, even though defendant acted in United Kingdom).
137. See Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178,208 (noting reasons for development
of territoriality). The court explained that:
the territoriality principle in criminal law was developed by the courts to respond
to two practical considerations, first, that a country has generally little direct
concern for the actions of malefactors abroad, and secondly, that other States may
legitimately take umbrage if a country attempts to regulate matters taking place
wholly or substantially within their territories. For these reasons the courts adopted
a presumption against the application of laws beyond the realm ....
Id.
138. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993) (explaining
effects of foreign antitrust violations on domestic insurance market).
139. See Libman, 2 S.C.R. at 209 (determining that state has legitimate interest in protect-
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2. Applying the Effects Principle to Computer Viruses
Given the legitimacy of the effects principle in both civil and criminal
cases, the principle should cover the release of a computer virus. 4° According
to S.S. Lotus, intent to harm is not necessary to invoke the effects principle.""
Therefore, the mere release of a virus that propagates 'rapidly and causes a
large amount of damage is sufficient to allow a damaged country to prescribe
the conduct of the distributor.'42 Damages from the Melissa virus exceeded
$80 million'43 and estimated damages from iloveyou reached $10 billion.'
It is hard to argue that these viruses did not have a substantial effect on a
country such as the United States, which has the largest presence on the
Interet.
45
Unlike the situation in the S.S. Lotus, viruses do not create a physical
invasion. 46 However, numerous countries recognize the economic effects of
a crime as a valid basis for jurisdiction.1 4  Therefore, a computer virus can
fall under the effects principle even if neither an intent to harm' 48 nor a
physical invasion exists.
149
ing its citizens from crimes committed abroad).
140. See infra notes 141-49 and accompanying text (detailing how effects principle covers
computer viruses).
141. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 37 (Sept. 7, 1927)
(Loder, J., dissenting) (noting that majority's decision effectively disposed of intent-to-harm
requirement).
142. See supra notes 105-36 and accompanying text (explaining recognition of effects
principle in cases involving damage similar to that caused by computer viruses).
143. See Moskowitz, supra note 16, at 37 (detailing damages caused by Melissa).
144. See Landler, supra note 8, at CI (estimating damages from iloveyou virus).
145. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) (stating that 60% of Internet hosts are
located in United States); Dawn C. Valdivia, Report on the E-Commerce Actiities of the OAS,
ICC, ABA, and Uncitral, 17 ARIZ. J. INT'L & CoMP. LAW 109,110 (2000) (noting that over 55%
of all Internet hosts are in United States and Canada).
146. Compare S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J at 10 (explaining that actions of French officer
resulted in Lotus cutting Boz-Kourt in half) with United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701,706 (6th
Cir. 1996) (noting that computer data is intangible).
147. See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) FORIOaN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNn'sD STATES § 403
cmt. n.3 (1987) (noting that Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Japan,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland have accepted economic effects as valid
basis for jurisdiction).
148. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 37 (Sept 7,1927) (Loder,
J., dissenting) (noting that majority's decision effectively disposed of intent-to-harm require-
ment).
149. See supra note 147 and accompanying text (noting that many countries view mere
economic effects as sufficient basis for jurisdiction).
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B. The Protective Principle
The protective principle, which is similar to the effects principle, allows
a state to criminalize conduct directed at the state from outside of the state.50
The difference between the effects principle and the protective principle is
that the protective principle requires that the action target the government of
the state itself.' Judge Loder described the protective principle in his dissent
in S. S. Lotus as "the jurisdiction over offences committed by foreigners
abroad... in so far as they are directed against the state itself or against its
security or credit." '
1. Legitimacy of the Protective Principle
In 1804, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Church v. Hubbart,'" which
contains the origins of the protective principle in the United States." 4 Church
involved an American ship that Portuguese authorities seized for attempting
to trade with the Portuguese colony of Brazil in contravention of Portuguese
law. 55 The Court used the protective principle to justify the actions of the
Portuguese authorities, stating that Portugal was within its rights to protect its
colonies from threats that originated outside of Portugal's territorial waters."5 6
150. See infra text accompanying note 152 (noting protective principle's extraterritorial
application).
151. SeeRESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGNRELATIONS LAW OFTHE UNrrED STATES § 402(3)
(1987) (explaining scope of protective principle).
152. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 35-36 (Sept. 7, 1927) (Loder,
J., dissenting).
153. 6 U.S. 187 (2 Cranch) (1804).
154. Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. 187 (2 Cranch) (1804) (recognizing Portugal's right to
protect its foreign colonies from vessels on high seas). Portuguese authorities boarded and
seized the Aurora, a ship flying the U.S. flag, off the coast of Brazil for smuggling and attacking
a Portuguese vessel. Id. at 188-89. The owner of the vessel submitted a claim requesting that
the insurance company pay for his losses but the insurance company refused, relying on clauses
in the policies exempting losses incurred by illicit trade with the Portuguese. Id. at 187. The
insurance company produced copies of Portuguese laws and ajudgment against theAurora from
a local Brazilian court to prove that the Portuguese officials confiscated the ship because of
illicit trade with the Portuguese colony. Id. at 189-98. The Court stated that it was lawful under
international law for Portugal to protect its sovereignty by acting outside of its territory. Id. at
220. The Court held that the Portuguese documents presented to the jury were not properly
authenticated and thus inadmissible. Id. at 227-30.
155. See id. at 198-99 (explaining Portuguese law prohibiting other nations from trading
with Portuguese colonies).
156. See id. at 234 (determining that state's "power to secure itself from injury [ may
certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory").
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More recently, several circuit courts have applied the protective princi-
ple, often in conjunction with other principles of jurisdiction.5 7 For instance,
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit used the protective principle in
a case involving false statements on a visa application."'8 Additionally, in a
case that involved a conspiracy to import drugs into the United States, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit used the protective principle to exert its
jurisdiction.159 Furthermore, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit used
the protective principle, in conjunction with the effects principle and passive
personality, to maintain jurisdiction over a defendant who assisted with the
kidnapping and murder of a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent."6°
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit used the protective
principle and passive personality in a case concerning a conspiracy to murder
a DEA agent.
161
Another U.S. case, United States v. bin Laden, 62 contains a sunmary of
the protective principle.!61 In bin Laden, the court explained that the United
157. See infra notes 158-61 (listing circuit court cases using protective principle).
158. See United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating that "the
protective principle ... covers the instant case"). The court went on to state that the protective
principle differs from the effects principle in that "there need not be any actual effect in the
country .... " Id. at 11.
159. See Marin v. United States, 352 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1965) (determining that U.S.
courts have jurisdiction over "a crime committed [by an alien] against the United States at a
time when the offender was corporeally out of the jurisdiction of the United States").
160. See United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200, 1206 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining
that defendant's actions "adversely affected the national interest"). The fact that the DEA agent
was a United States citizen contributed to the court's finding that there was a "significant
detrimental effect in the United States" and that the DEA agent was attacked because he was a
United States citizen. Id. The court determined that it did not need to "decide whether any of
these facts or principles, standing alone, would be sufficient. Rather, we hold that cumulatively
applied they require the conclusion that giving extraterritorial effect" to the statute was proper.
Id.
161. See United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 1984) (stating that
"[tlwo of the principles [of jurisdiction] ... are applicable in this case - the protective principle
and the passive personality principle").
162. 92 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
163. See United States v. bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2600) (recogniz-
ing "the right of the United States to defend itself from harmful conduct regardless of its locus").
The case involved fifteen defendants charged in a conspiracy to bomb the U.S. embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania, which resulted in 223 deaths. Id. at 192. The court ruled on the extraterri-
torial jurisdiction of several federal statutes. Id. The court held that counts 234, 235, 240, and
241 dealt with statutes that were specifically limited to U.S. territory. Id. The court held that
18 U.S.C. § 844(f), (h), and (n) (destroying buildings with explosives or using explosives in
commission of felony), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (using or carrying firearm during commission of
crime of violence), 18 U.S.C. § 930(c) (killing someone in federal facility), 18 U.S.C. § 1114
1526 59 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1507 (2002)
States has the right to protect itself from harm regardless of where the harm
originates.'64 The court examined whether or not certain federal statutes
applied extraterritorially. 6 s Judge Sand found that the protective principle
applied to all but two of the federal statutes in question, regardless of where
the crimes occurred."6
Further support for the protective principle exists outside of the United
States. 67 The leading case in the United Kingdom, Joyce v. Director of
Public Prosecutions,6 ' involved a treasonous act committed during World
War 11.169 The defendant in Joyce appealed his conviction for treason, result-
ing from activities committed in Germany during the war." ° The Court
determined that an English court could try an alien for acts committed abroad
and directed at the security of the United Kingdom. 7' The Court went so far
as to say that "the protective jurisdiction here contended for is well recognized
(killing or attempting to kill officer or employee of United States), and 18 U.S.C. § 2155(a) and
(b) (attacking or conspiring to attack national-defense structures of United States) all applied
extraterritorially. Id. at 198-204.
164. See id. at 197 (explaining protective principle).
165. See id. at 192 (noting need to determine extraterritorial effect of statutes); see also
infra Part IV.B (analyzing extraterritorial application of 1994 Act).
166. See bin Laden, 92 F.Supp. 2d at 192 (summarizing holding as dismissing only counts
specifically limited to U.S. territory).
167. See infia notes 168-77 and accompanying text (detailing cases in courts outside of
United States using protective principle).
168. [19461 A.C. 347 (HL).
169. See Joyce v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1946] A-C. 347, 348 (H.L.) (outlining
charges against defendant). The defendant obtained a British passport and left England in 1939.
Id. at 348-49. The defendant was later convicted of treason for broadcasting propaganda on
behalf of Germany, which was at war with England, while the defendant lived in Germany. Id.
The defendant appealed his conviction to the House of Lords on the grounds that he owed no
allegiance to Great Britain, that protection by the Crown is necessary to prove allegiance, that
protection of the Crown must be exercisable, that the renewal of defendant's passport was
insufficient to prove protection of the Crown, and that no English court had jurisdiction over
aliens acting on foreign soil. Id. at 350-51. The Court determined that the defendant owed
allegiance to the Crown and that the Crown still protected the defendant. Id. at 359. The Court
stated that international law does not specifically prohibit a state from exercising its jurisdiction
upon aliens who act abroad. Id. at 356. The Court held that although a rebuttable presumption
exists that English laws do not act extraterritorially, the treason law of 1351 allows English
courts to try aliens for acts committed abroad. Id. at 336-37.
170. See id. at 348-49 (detailing defendant's actions in obtaining passport, traveling to
Germany, and broadcasting propaganda for Germany).
171. See id. at 356 (stating that "there is no principle that no alien is triable in England for
offences committed abroad").
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in international law."1 72 In addition to treason, the House of Lords has sub-
jected an alien living abroad to bankruptcy proceedings in England.
173
Other European courts also apply the protective principle.' 74 For in-
stance, the Supreme Court of Holland upheld the conviction of a Belgian
woman for being an accessory while in Belgium to an offense under the Dutch
Currency Decree.' In Belgium, the Court of Cassation ruled that a Belgian
court could try a foreign soldier for actions committed abroad that threatened
the safety of Belgium.176 In addition, treason against France, or its World War
II allies, is justiciable in French courts, even if the defendant is a foreign
national acting outside of the borders of France.
1 77
Numerous other states recognize the protective principle in cases and in
statutes.78 The justification for the protective principle is that most states are
ill-equipped to deal with domestic attacks on the sovereignty of foreign
states. 79 This justification parallels the growth of computer crime throughout
the world, in which many countries have neither laws criminalizing the
conduct' nor the technological expertise to determine who committed the
crime.181
172. Id. at 358.
173. See Theophile v. Solicitor-General, [1950] A.C. 186, 195-97 (H.L.) (stating that
bankruptcy laws were meant to be enforced extraterritorially).
174. See infra notes 175-77 and accompanying text (noting cases in France, Belgium and
Holland that use protective principle).
175. See Public Prosecutor v. L., 18 I.L.R. 206, 206 (HR 1951) (stating that Belgian
national could be convicted under Dutch currency law for actions committed in Belgium).
176. See Nusselein v. Belgian State, 17 I.L.R. 135, 135 (Bel. 1950) (holding that Belgian
courts have jurisdiction over crimes against Belgium's safety committed by foreign soldiers,
whether in Belgium or abroad).
177. See Re van den Plas, 22 I.L.R. 205, 207 (Fr. 1955) (deciding that Belgian national
could be tried in France for treason against Belgium, which was wartime ally of France).
178. See Edwin D. Dickinson, RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, UNDER THE AUsPICEs
OF THE FACULTY OF THE HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, (1932),
reprinted in 29 AM. J. INTI LAw 435, 543-61 (Supp. 1935) (detailing national statutes and cases
recognizing protective principle).
179. See id. at 552 (stating that protective principle is justified by "inadequacy of most
national legislation [in] punishing offenses committed within the territory against the security,
integrity and independence of foreign States").
180. See Moskowitz, supra note 16, at 37 (stating that Philippines had no computer crime
statute prior to 2000).
181. See John Schwartz & David A. Vise, 'Love' Virus Is Traced to Philippines; Authori-
ties Move to Seize Computers Used in Attack WASH. POST, May 6, 2000, at Al (noting how
quickly FBI traced iloveyou to Philippines).
1527
1528 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1507 (2002)
2. Applying the Protective Principle to Computer Viruses
Although computer viruses seem to fit relatively easily into the frame-
work of the effects principle," 2 only a very specifically targeted virus would
meet the requirements of the protective principle." 3 For the protective princi-
ple to operate, the virus must target the instrumentality or the functioning of
the state." 4 Thus, although the Melissa and iloveyou viruses affected some
governmental computers,"8 5 they did not specifically target the U.S. govern-
ment.' Therefore, neither virus would have invoked the protective
principle.1
7
However, it is possible for the protective principle to encompass at least
some computer viruses.' For instance, CodeRed, which specifically targeted
the White House website, s9 would allow the United States to use the protec-
five principle."s Although CodeRed did not seriously affect the security of
the United States or the ability of the U.S. government to function,'9" it
targeted the U.S. government. 92 Therefore, a court could use the protective
principle in allowing jurisdiction over the distributor of CodeRed even if the
distributor acted while abroad.' 93 Thus, the United States can use the protec-
182. See supra notes 140-145 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of effects
principle to computer viruses).
183. See infra text accompanying notes 184-94 (noting how viruses can trigger protective
principle).
184. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (explaining that protective principle
requires crime against security of state or governmental functions).
185. See Landler, supra note 8, at Cl (claiming that iloveyou affected Pentagon comput-
ers).
186. See Chien & Ewell, supra note 9 (explaining how iloveyou operated); Elnitiarta,
supra note 2 (detailing how Melissa operated).
187. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (requiring that actions target government
under protective principle).
188. See infra notes 189-94 and accompanying text (giving example and explaining why
CodeRed falls under protective principle).
189. See Eric Chien, Security Response: CodeRed Worm, at http'//www.symantec.
com/avcenter/venc/data/codered.worm.html (last modified Sept. 24, 2002) (stating that "if the
date is between the 20th and 28th of the month, the active threads then attempt a Denial of
Service attack on... 198.137.240.91, which was www.whitehouse.gov").
190. See infra text accompanying notes 191-94 (detailing why CodeRed invokes protective
principle).
191. See Chien, supra note 189 (noting that IP address 198.137.240.91 "is no longer
active").
192. See id. (detailing effects of CodeRed, which consisted mainly of Denial of Service
attacks on White House website's IP address).
193. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (explaining that extraterritorial attacks on
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tive principle if an instrumentality of the U.S. government is targeted, al-
though very few viruses are likely to meet this requirement. 94
C. Passive Personality
A third basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction is passive personality. 9 '
Passive personality is also known as passive nationality' because it refers to
the nationality of the victim, while active nationality refers to the nationality
of the perpetrator."9 Passive personality protects citizens from crimes com-
mitted against them because of their nationality.1 Similar to the effects and
protective principles, passive personality allows a state to prescribe laws
against the actions of aliens who act while in foreign countries.' 99
1. Legitimacy of Passive Personality
Passive personality enjoys the least support of any of the bases of juris-
diction to prescribe." ° Even though the laws of some twenty-seven countries
recognized the principle in 1935,201 courts around the world rarely apply this
principle. The United States and the United Kingdom were early critics of





U.S. government are covered by protective principle).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 184-93 (noting difficulty of applying protective
principle to most computer viruses).
195. See supra notes 71-72, 79-82 and accompanying text (listing different bases of
extraterritorial jurisdiction to prescribe).
196. See Menthe, supra note 48, at 72 (describing active and passive nationality).
197. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF TIIE UNriED STATES § 402
cmt. e (1987) (explaining nationality principle).
198. See id. § 402 cmt. g (stating purpose of passive personality).
199. See id. (mentioning that passive personality allows state to "apply law ... to an act
committed outside its territory by a person not its national").
200. See Dickinson, supra note 178, at 579 (stating that "jiurisdiction asserted upon the
principle of passive personality without qualifications has been more strongly contested than
any other type of competence"); BROWNLIE, supra note 49, at 303 (noting that passive personal-
ity "is the least justifiable, as a general principle, of the various bases ofjurisdiction").
201. See Dickinson, supra note 178, at 578 (listing statutes from twenty-seven countries
that recognized passive personality). The countries that recognized passive personality in 1935
were: Albania, Brazil, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, France, Greece,
Guatemala, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Monaco, Peru, Poland, Rumania, Russia,
San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Id.
202. See id. at 579 (noting strong opposition of United States and United Kingdom to
passive personality priniple).
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While the United States is one of the most aggressive states in its exer-
cise of jurisdiction outside of its own borders, 3 relatively few cases invoke
passive personality in the United States.2 Courts in the United States occa-
sionally bolster their justification for allowing jurisdiction by using passive
personality along with other bases of jurisdiction." 5 However, not even the
U.S. Restatement of Foreign Relations, which is more accepting of extraterri-
torial jurisdiction than are many countries," gives passive personality full
endorsement.2°
The Cutting Case" is the most widely cited case in which a court used
passive personality.0 9 This case involved an American citizen charged in
Mexico for libelous statements about a Mexican citizen. 210 The statements
appeared in a U.S. newspaper in 1886.211 Despite the protests of the United
States, Mexico approved the use of passive personality against a foreigner, 12
203. See BROWNUE, supra note 49, at 308 (noting "strong reaction from a large number
of foreign governments" in response to American exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction).
204. See id. at 308-09 (detailing limited international judicial reaction to United States'
policies on exerting extraterritorial jurisdiction).
205. See United States v. Felix.Outierrez, 940 F.2d 1200, 1206 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that
combination of effects principle, protective principle, and passive personality were sufficient
to allow jurisdiction); United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1316-17 (11th Cir. 1984)
(applying protective principle and passive personality in order to justify jurisdiction).
206. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 402 (1987) (stating acceptable bases of jurisdiction) with BROWNLJE, supra note 49, at 308
(noting hostile reaction of many states to United States exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction).
207. See RESTATEMENT (THIR) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402
cmt. g (1987) (noting that passive personality is rarely accepted, except against terrorism).
208. (1886),reprintedin 2 JOHNBASSETrMOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST § 201,at
228 (1906).
209. See The Cutting Case (1886), reprinted in 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW DIGEST § 201, at 228 (1906) (explaining Mexico's use of passive personality). The Cutting
Case involved an American, A.K. Cutting, who published statements about a Mexican citizen
in a United States paper. Id. at 229. Upon Cutting's return to Mexico, Mexican authorities
charged him with libel under Article 186 of the Mexican Penal Code, which allowed Mexico
to exert jurisdiction over foreigners who commit acts against Mexicans in foreign countries.
Id. at 230, 232. The United States claimed that this case "disclosed a claim of jurisdiction by
Mexico, novel in our history, whereby any offense, committed anywhere by a foreigner...
[can] be there tried and punished in conformity with Mexican laws." Id at 231. However, the
Mexican courts sustained jurisdiction over Cutting, and the executive branch of the Mexican
government gave its approval. Id.
210. Id. at 229.
211. Id.
212. See id. at 231 (stating that "jurisdiction was sustained by the courts of Mexico... and
approved by the executive branch of that government").
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without requiring any showing of effects within Mexico.21 In addition, the
court found no evidence that the defendant singled out the Mexican citizen
based on his nationality.214 This is a rare case, and in the last 125 years no
judicial recognition of passive personality in the torts context is evident.
The more commonly accepted use of passive personality involves terror-
ism."' Many states, including the United States, acknowledge the legitimacy
of seeking to protect nationals from terrorist activities.216 However, computer
viruses do not rise to the level of terrorism.2" Although there is no formally
accepted definition of terrorism, the release of a computer virus does not
instill the same level of fear that the bombing of buildings and the hijacking
of airplanes instills.2"' Even if viruses did constitute a terrorist activity, other
bases of jurisdiction would encompass the activity.219
2. Applying Passive Personality to Computer Viruses
Assuming for the moment that passive personality is a valid basis for
asserting jurisdiction, it is unlikely to apply to computer viruses.220 It is very
difficult to write a virus that targets victims based on their nationality. 1
However, CodeRed is a computer virus that could be characterized as target-
ing U.S. nationals.2 22 For instance, CodeRed attacked www.whitehouse.gov 2'
and defaced websites hosted on computers with a default language of
213. See id. at 229 (noting that "paper was not published in Mexico").
214. See id. (explaining that libelous statement concerned "a citizen of Mexico, with whom
Mr. Cutting has been in controversy").
215. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrrED STATEs § 402
cmt. g (1987) (stating that passive personality "has not been generally accepted for ordinary
torts or crimes, but it is increasingly accepted as applied to terrorist" activities).
216. See id. (noting growing acceptance of passive personality for acts of terrorism).
217. SeeMarkLacter, Spreading the Virus,23 L.A. Bus. J. 46,46 (Dec. 10,2001) (stating
that "computer viruses are not akin to terrorist attacks").
218. Id.
219. See infra text accompanying notes 229-34 (explaining how passive personality covers
same crimes as effects or protective principles).
220. See infra notes 226-28 and accompanying text (detailing difficulty of targeting U.S.
nationals with computer virus).
221. See infra notes 226-28 and accompanying text (noting difficulty of creating virus
based on nationality of victim).
222. See infra notes 223-25 and accompanying text (determining that CodeRed indirectly
targeted U.S. citizens).
223. See Chien, supra note 189 (explaining that CodeRed launched Denial of Service
attacks against IP address of www.whitehouse.gov).
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English.224 Thus, CodeRed indirectly targeted citizens of the United States
because of their nationality.22 5 Another way to spread a computer virus to a
specific nationality is to write the text in a language used primarily by that
country. 26 This strategy is unlikely to target only the United States because
English is so prevalent outside of the United States. 227 Finally, a virus could
detect the time zone that the computer is set to and activate only if it is a U.S.
time zone.
228
Although it seems possible for a computer virus to target nationals of a
specific country, any such attempt will almost certainly fall under the more
acceptable forms of jurisdiction, such as the effects or protective principles.2 29
For example, for a virus to invoke passive personality but not the effects or
protective principles, it would have to target U.S. citizens23 ° without any
substantial effect in the United States23' and without affecting U.S. interests
abroad or government functions.232 Such a virus would be very specialized
and would not be particularly effective.233 Therefore, although passive
224. Id.
225. Attacking the White House website, only activating on web servers with a default
language of English, and defacing websites with the text: "Hacked By Chinese!" suggests that
the virus targeted U.S. citizens. Id. This is reinforced by the fact that the virus was first
discovered on Monday, July 16, 2001 (id.), three days after the IOC awarded Beijing the 2008
Olympic Summer Games (Ross Siler & Jim Reedy, Beijing Vote Brings Mixed Reaction;
Decision Seen as Positive Step for China, WASH. POST, July 14, 2001, at D1), which the U.S.
Congress opposed. See Jere Longman, Beijing Expected to Receive the 2008 Summer Games
When the LO.C. Votes, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2001, see. 8 at 1 (noting congressional opposition
to Beijing hosting Olympics in 2008).
226. See Chien & Ewell, supra note 9 (identifying seven variants of iloveyou virus with
E-mail message written in languages other than English, including Spanish, Italian, Lithuanian,
and German).
227. English is the primary language in 104 countries. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK
OF FAcTs 2002 447 (2002).
228. See Raul Elnitiarta, Symantec Security Response: W97M.Melissa.M, at
http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w97m.melissa.m.html (last visited
Dec. 16, 2002) (noting that Melissa variant M E-mails information about infected computer,
including time zone, to three E-mail addresses).
229. See infra text accompanying notes 230-32 (suggesting that effects and protective
principles are better suited for dealing with computer viruses).
230. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (explaining requirement of passive
personality that crime targets state's nationals).
231. See supra Part ITA (noting that effects principle requires substantial impact on state's
territory).
232. See supra Part fT1.B (requiring that crime targets state's instrumentality in order to
invoke protective principle).
233. Viruses propagate most effectively by exploiting commonly used languages and
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personality may bolster the case for jurisdiction in specific cases, it is unlikely
to be the sole basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction over a computer virus.234
D. Universal Jurisdiction
The final basis for jurisdiction to prescribe is universal jurisdiction.235
Although universal jurisdiction has broad support,236 it is limited to univer-
sally recognized crimes.237 Originally, universal jurisdiction only applied to
piracy cases. 23" However, countries now recognize other crimes as being
subject to universal jurisdiction.239 Nonetheless, computer viruses do not rise
to the level of a peremptory norm that would justify universal jurisdiction.240
1. Legitimacy of Universal Jurisdiction
There is worldwide recognition of universal jurisdiction with respect to
piracy.24  The global community also condemns other crimes under universal
computer programs. If more computers use a particular program or language, then more
systems can be infected by exploiting a weakness in that program or language.
234. See supra notes 220-33 and accompanying text (explaining why passive personality
is not well suited to computer viruses).
235. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404
(1987) (defining universal jurisdiction).
236. See infra notes 241-56 and accompanying text (detailing international support for
universal jurisdiction).
237. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNrTED STATES § 404
(1987) (explaining types of crimes that invoke universal jurisdiction).
238. See Dickinson, supra note 178, at 563 (maintaining that "State has jurisdiction with
respect to any crime committed outside its territory by an alien which constitutes piracy by
international law").
239. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404
(1987) (stating that states have "jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for certain
offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such as piracy, slave
trade, ... hijacking ... , genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism"); Patrick
L. Donnelly, Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over Acts of Terrorism Committed Abroad:
OmnibusDiplomatic Security andAntiterrorismAct of 1986, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 599,603-04
(1987) (describing crimes covered by universal jurisdiction).
240. See infra notes 257-60 and accompanying text (explaining why computer viruses do
not justify universal jurisdiction).
241. See Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 14, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2317, 450
U.N.T.S. 82, 92 ("All States shall co-operate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of
piracy .... "); see also 2 GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
§ 203 at 681 (1941) ("It has long been recognized and well settled that persons and vessels
engaged in piratical operations.. . may be punished by any nation.. . ."); Dickinson, supra
note 178, at 563 (noting that "jurisdiction of the State to prosecute and punish for piracy... is
everywhere recognized"); The Cutting Case (1886), reprinted in JOHN BASSETr MOORE,
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jurisdiction, as evidenced by both treaties and cases.242 Numerous interna-




INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST § 201, at 951-52 (explaining that piracy "is an offense against the
law of nations... and [the pirate] is treated as an outlaw, whom any nation may in the interests
of all capture and punish").
242. See infra notes 243-55 and accompanying text (outlining treaties and cases that
support universal jurisdiction).
243. See Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, art. 2(b), 46 Stat. 2183, 2191, 60 L.N.T.S.
253, 263 (agreeing that "[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake... to bring about. . . the
complete abolition of slavery in all its forms"); Protocol amending the Slavery Convention, Dec.
7, 1953, 7 U.S.T. 479, 481-82, 182 U.N.T.S. 51, 52, 54 (adopting Slavery Convention under
United Nations), Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 3
(calling on parties to abolish slavery and similar practices); International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 8, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175 (stating that "[n]o one shall be
held in slavery; slavery and the slave trade in all their forms shall be prohibited"); Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, art. 4, GA. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (same); Convention on the High Seas,Apr. 29, 1958, art. 13, 13 U.S.T.
2312, 2316, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 90 (agreeing that "[e]very State shall adopt effective measures
to prevent and punish the transportation of slaves in ships authorized to fly its flag").
244. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (codifying
war crimes); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick,
and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 (same); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949,6 U.S.T. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135 (same); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
(same).
245. See Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, art. 11(1), 20 U.S.T. 2941, 2947 (requiring contracting states to "take
all appropriate measures to restore control of the [hijacked] aircraft to its lawful commander or
to preserve his control of the aircraft"); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, art. 7, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 1646, 860 U.N.T.S. 105, 109 (requiring states
to prosecute or extradite hijackers found within their territorial boundaries).
246. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, art. 1, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 (declaring that "[g]enocide, whether committed in time
of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which [the Parties] undertake to
prevent and punish").
247. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3(lXa), 6 U.S.T. 3114, 3116, 75
U.N.T.S. 31, 32 (stating that "the following acts shall remain prohibited... murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture"); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1949, art. 3(lXa), 6 U.S.T. 3217, 3222, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, 88 (same); Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3(lXa), 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3318,
3320, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 138 (same); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
1534
THE LONG ARM OF US. JURISDICTION TO PRESCRBE
In addition to treaties, numerous cases in national courts suggest that the
international community recognizes universal jurisdiction.24 For example, in
the United Kingdom, the House of Lords recognizes universal jurisdiction in
cases of torture.249 Australia recognizes genocide as a crime that justifies
universal jurisdiction."' The Supreme Court of Canada has held that war
crimes and crimes against humanity invoke universal jurisdiction.25' Finally,
the United States uses universal jurisdiction for hijacking,252 other crimes
committed on aircraft,253 drug trafficking, 4 and terrorism.255 There is ample
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 3(l)(a), 6 U.S.T. 3516,3518,3520,75 U.N.T.S.
287,290 (same); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 7,999
U.N.T.S. 171, 175 (agreeing that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment"); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5, GA. Res.
217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No. 13, U.N. Doe. A/810 (1948) (same); Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10,
1984, art. 2(1), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 114 (stating that "[e]ach State Party shall take effective
legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory
under its jurisdiction"); Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 2, G.A.Res.
3452, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, U.N. Doe. A/XXX (1975) (stating that "[a]ny act
of torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment is an offense to human
dignity and shall be condemned as a denial of the purposes of the Charter of the United
Nations").
248. See infra notes 249-55 and accompanying text (outlining international cases accepting
universal jurisdiction).
249. See Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, exparte Pinochet Ugarte, (No.
3) (2000] 1 A.C. 147, 160 (H.L. 1999) (recognizing torture as peremptory norm that justifies
universal jurisdiction).
250. See Nulyarimma v. Thompson [1999] FCA 1192, 1203 (identifying genocide as
peremptory norm that is subject to universal jurisdiction).
251. See Regina v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 717 (explaining that "conduct listed under
crimes against humanity was of the sort that no modem civilized nation was able to sanction").
252. See United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1133 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (noting that
"hijacking crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction"); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086,
1092 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (stating that "[a]ircraft hijacking may well be one of the few crimes so
clearly condemned under the law of nations that states may assert universal jurisdiction to bring
offenders to justice, even when the state has no territorial connection to the hijacking and its
citizens are not involved").
253. See United States v. Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673,682 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (determining that
blowing up commercial airliner filled with people "is at least as heinous a crime of international
concern as hijacking"); United States v. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. 912, 919 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)
(explaining that "[mI]any crimes committed aboard aircraft are considered both by the United
States and the international community to be 'Offenses against the Law of Nations,"' including
sabotage and hijacking).
254. See United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 373 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that "traffick-
ing in controlled substances aboard vessels is a serious international problem and is universally
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evidence that these crimes have risen to the level of peremptory norms and
thus invoke universal jurisdiction.256
2. Applying Universal Jurisdiction to Computer Viruses
While there is worldwide recognition of universal jurisdiction, computer
viruses do not rise to the level of a violation of a peremptory norm, so they do
not invoke universal jurisdiction.257 Peremptory norms only apply to heinous
crimes that all civilized nations revile.28 Moreover, computer crimes do not
even rise to the level of terrorism, much less to the level of a peremptory




The United States' exercise of jurisdiction over an alien acting abroad is
consistent with international law when the alien releases a virus that has
substantial effects within the United States or that targets the U.S. govern-
ment.261 The effects principle is widely accepted and applies to computer
viruses that cause substantial damage in the United StateS.262 In addition, the
protective principle is applicable to viruses that specifically target the U.S.
government.263 However, passive personality is less widely accepted than the
condemned" (quoting 46 U.S.C. app. § 1902 (1986))); United States v. Martinez-Hidalgo, 993
F.2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that "the trafficking of narcotics is condemned univer-
sally by law-abiding nations").
255. See United States v. bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (highlight-
ing "certain acts of terrorism" as means of tying case to universal jurisdiction); Flatow v. Islamic
Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 14 (D.D.C. 1998) (stating that "international terrorism is
subject to universal jurisdiction").
256. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (explaining peremptory norms).
257. See infra notes 258-59 and accompanying text (concluding that releasing computer
viruses does not violate peremptory norm).
258. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text (noting nature of activity necessary to
create peremptory norm).
259. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text (arguing that viruses do not rise to
level of terrorist activity).
260. Universal jurisdiction is only applicable to peremptory norms. See supra note 237
and accompanying text (explaining limitations on universal jurisdiction).
261. See supra notes 140-45, 188-94 and accompanying text (explaining that effects and
protective principles cover computer viruses).
262. See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text (noting that effects principle applies
to computer viruses).
263. See supra text accompanying notes 188-94 (determining that protective principle is
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effects and protective principles, and it is unlikely that a virus could effec-
tively target U.S. citizens based on their nationality.2" Finally, universal
jurisdiction does not apply to computer viruses because they are not a peremp-
tory norm.
265
IV Applying the Computer Crime Statute Extraterritorially
Although international law allows the United States to prescribe laws that
prohibit aliens from releasing viruses,266 two questions remain unanswered.
The first question is whether or not extraterritorial jurisdiction meets the
requirement of reasonableness and international comity.267 The second ques-
tion is whether or not Congress intended the 1994 Act to function
extraterritorially.
26
A. Reasonableness and Comity
After a court determines that the jurisdiction to prescribe exists, it must
determine whether or not the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. 69 Even
though the Supreme Court at times has chosen to ignore the reasonableness
test, -0 as formulated in the Restatement, 27 international comity still requires
that a state balance its interests against the interests of other countries. 2 2 The
United States should balance its interests against the country where the virus
applicable to computer viruses).
264. See supra text accompanying notes 229-34 (arguing that passive personality is ill-
suited to dealing with computer viruses).
265. See supra text accompanying notes 257-60 (explaining that computer viruses do not
invoke universal jurisdiction).
266. See supra note 261 and accompanying text (arguing that United States may exercise
jurisdiction over alien who releases viruses affecting country or government).
267. See infra Part IV.A (exploring reasonableness of extraterritorial jurisdiction for
computer viruses).
268. See infra Part IV.B (explaining that Congress intended 1994 Act to apply
extraterritorially).
269. See infra notes 270-74 and accompanying text (noting reasons why reasonableness
and international comity are important).
270. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993) (determining that
international comity was irrelevant to antitrust action).
271. SeeRETATEMENTm(IRD)FoREIGNRELATIoNS LAWOFTHEUNrrEDSTATEs § 403(1)
(1987) (requiring that exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction be reasonable).
272. See BROWNLE, supra note 49, at 29-30 (noting that comity is act of politeness toward
other nations).
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originates. 3 and also against other countries that feel a significant effect from
the virus.274
In many situations in which a state exercises extraterritorial jurisdiction,
more than one state has the jurisdiction to prescribe.275 Comity and reason-
ableness require states to balance their interests against the interests of other
states."' Determining whether or not jurisdiction is reasonable requires the
court to weigh the interests of the United States against the interests of any
other country that could prescribe laws governing the same conduct.277
The first step is for the United States to weigh its interests against the
interests of the country from which the virus originated.27 If the originating
country does not have laws that prohibit computer viruses, then no conflict
between the United States and the originating country will take place.79
Although a conflict would exist if prosecution was unforeseeable, or if the
laws of the originating state and the United States could not both be satisfied,
neither of these possibilities exists in the case of a computer virus.28 °
States have a right to protect their citizens from unforeseeable prosecu-
tion in foreign states.2"" However, the rapid spread of a computer virus is
foreseeable to its creator, especially if the virus propagates quickly by
design.282 Thus, after Melissa and iloveyou, a virus writer cannot claim
ignorance of the potential effects and damages caused by computer viruses,
273. The country in which the virus originates has jurisdiction under the territoriality and
possibly nationality principles. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text (explaining
nationality and territoriality principles).
274. If the United States can base jurisdiction on effects within the United States, then
other countries can similarly base jurisdiction on effects within their countries. See supra notes
128-37 and accompanying text (discussing use of effects principle by Canada and United
Kingdom).
275. See JENNINGS & WATrS, supra note 50, at 463 (noting circumstances under which
multiple states have jurisdiction).
276. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(2)
(1987) (stating that states must evaluate relevant factors).
277. See id. (listing factors to be weighed in determining reasonableness).
278. See supra note 273 and accompanying text (arguing that United States should balance
its interest against those of country where virus originates).
279. See infra notes 280-90 and accompanying text (noting that because there is no conflict
of laws or foreseeability issue, there is no comity issue).
280. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403(2)(a), (g), and (h) (1987) (stating that conflicting laws and foreseeability are issues when
determining reasonableness).
281. See United States v. bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189,218 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that
people have right to fair warning that conduct is proscribed).
282. See supra notes 4, 11 and accompanying text (explaining rapid spread of Melissa and
iloveyou viruses).
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especially those that exploit security holes in popular computer software." 3
Furthermore, the global nature of the Internet makes the rapid distribution of
a virus to the United States foreseeable. 4 Therefore, based on readily avail-
able information, script writers are well aware of the potential for causing
substantial damage in the United States, regardless of where they release the
virus.2" 5 Moreover, it is not unforeseeable that the United States will try to
prosecute the people who release these viruses." 6
The U.S. prohibition on releasing computer viruses that affect U.S.
computers does not conflict with the laws of other states.2"1 In order for a
conflict to arise, it would be necessary that a person could not obey both the
laws of the originating country and the laws of the United States.28  There-
fore, 'in the case of a computer virus, that would mean that the laws of the
originating country would require the perpetrator to release a virus. A law
requiring people to release computer viruses is illogical.289 Thus, no conflict
of laws arises from computer viruses.2 °
The second step in determining if an exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable
is for the United States to weigh its interests against the interests of other
affected countries.29 There are three ways in which the United States could
exert jurisdiction extraterritorially if other countries feel the effects. The
United States could exercise jurisdiction if it was specifically targeted, if it
was the most substantially affected, or if it exercises concurrent jurisdiction.29
283. See Chien & Ewell, supra note 9 (noting how iloveyou propagated rapidly by
exploiting security flaws); Elnitiarta, supra note 2 (detailing how Melissa spread rapidly by
exploiting security hole in Microsoft Outlook).
284. See Marc D. Goodman, Why the Police Don't CareAbout Computer Crime, 10 HARV.
J.L. & TEcH. 465,471 (1997) (noting that "[blits of information... flow effortlessly around the
globe, rendering the traditional concept of distance meaningless").
285. See supra notes 1-20 (explaining damages caused by Melissa and iloveyou viruses).
286. See Ackermann, supra note 14, at 107 (noting rapid capture of David Smith and
charges against Smith in connection with release of Melissa).
287. See infra text accompanying notes 288-90 (determining that computer virus laws do
not create conflict with laws of other states).
288. See United States v. bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that
conflict of laws arises only if laws are incompatible).
289. A law requiring people to spread computer viruses would be ineffectual in less
developed countries due to a lack of computers and would be contrary to the interests of
developed nations that rely on computers.
290. See supra notes 288-89 and accompanying text (maintaining that U.S. computer virus
laws do not conflict with laws of other states).
291. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (arguing that United States should balance
its interests against those of other countries affected by virus).
292. See infra notes 293-306 and accompanying text (detailing methods of exerting
1539
1540 59 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1507 (2002)
The United States has a right to protect itself.. 3 and its citizens from
harm.294 Moreover, the United States has a greater interest in preserving U.S.
government facilities and protecting U.S. citizens than other countries have;
thus, it is reasonable for the United States to prescribe laws for its own
protection. 9 Therefore, if a virus targets the U.S. government or U.S. citi-
zens, then it is reasonable for the United States to exert jurisdiction over the
person who released the virus even if the virus affects other states.296
Similarly, the United States can exert jurisdiction because it incurs a
greater cost from computer viruses than does any other country.2" As the
largest user of the Internet and the country most dependent on computers, the
United States bears a disproportionate share of the costs associated with
computer viruses.2 9 Therefore, the huge disparity in Internet users between
the United States and any other country justifies the United States in exerting
jurisdiction over computer viruses because the United States is disproportion-
ately harmed.
299
A final method for dealing with international comity is concurrent
jurisdiction.3" It is not unreasonable for multiple jurisdictions to prescribe
laws affecting the same conduct.3"' In almost any case that involves extraterri-
torial jurisdiction, multiple states will have jurisdiction to prosecute. 0 2 The
extraterritorial jurisdiction in situations in which other states also have jurisdiction).
293. See JENNINGS & WATrS, supra note 50, at 416-27 (summarizing states' rights to self-
preservation and self defense).
294. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text (explaining use of passive personality
to protect citizens from harm).
295. See Dickinson, supra note 178, at 552 (noting "inadequacy of most national legisla-
tion [in] punishing offenses committed within the territory against the security, integrity and
independence of foreign States").
296. See supra text accompanying notes 188-94 (arguing that United States has jurisdiction
if virus specifically targets United States).
297. See infra note 298 and accompanying text (noting disproportionate harm from
computer viruses).
298. The United States has approximately 50% of all Internet hosts and less than 5% of the
world population. Compare supra note 145 (noting percentage of Internet hosts located in
United States) with THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BooK OF FACTS 2002, at 867 (2002) (stating
U.S. population at 278,058,881 and world population at 6,157,000,000).
299. See supra note 298 and accompanying text (explaining disproportionate impact of
computer viruses on United States).
300. See infra notes 301-06 and accompanying text (detailing concurrent jurisdiction).
301. See infra notes 302-05 and accompanying text (noting use of concurrent jurisdiction
in international law).
302. By its very name, extraterritorial jurisdiction refers to jurisdiction that is not based on
where the action occurred. Because most jurisdiction is territorial, both the state in which the
action took place and the state invoking extraterritorial jurisdiction can have jurisdiction to
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country acting extraterritorially will have jurisdiction and either the country
in which the activity occurred 3 or the country of citizenship of the perpetra-
tor,3°4 or both, will have jurisdiction. Moreover, international law allows for
concurrent jurisdiction.305 Thus, the United States and other countries may
each exercise jurisdiction over the same offense.3°
Therefore, it is reasonable for the United States to exert jurisdiction over
aliens who release viruses that cause significant damage to the United
States.3'1 No issue of comity between the United States and the country where
the virus originated results if the originating country does not have appropriate
computer crime laws.3r Similarly, if the virus targets or disproportionately
affects the United States, no issue of comity between the United States and
other affected states results.3°
B. Applying the 1994 Act Extraterritorially
The United States has the authority to exert jurisdiction over computer
viruses extraterritorially, 31° but the question is whether Congress intended for
the 1994 Act to apply extraterritorially. Not all laws act extraterritorially.
311
prescribe. See supra notes 71, 73 and accompanying text (explaining territorial jurisdiction).
303. See supra notes 71, 73 and accompanying text (outlining principle of territoriality).
304. See supra notes 72, 74 and accompanying text (stating how nationality principle
operates).
305. See S.S. Lotus, .(Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 30-31 (Sept. 7, 1927)
(explaining that France and Turkey had concurrent jurisdiction over acts of French officer);
Libman v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 178, 212 (deciding that although possibility of being
tried in multiple jurisdictions exists, "any injustice that might result from this eventuality could
be avoided by resort to the pleas of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict, which have been
applied to persons tried in other countries"); United States v. bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189,
214 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that "concurrent jurisdiction is permitted by international law").
306. See supra notes 300-05 and accompanying text (explaining legitimacy of concurrent
jurisdiction).
307. See supra notes 287-306 and accompanying text (arguing that it is reasonable for
United States to use extraterritorial jurisdiction in computer virus cases).
308. See supra notes 287-90 and accompanying text (stating that there is no conflict of
laws issue in computer virus cases).
309. See supra notes 291-306 and accompanying text (determining that United States
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in virus cases does not offend international comity in
respect to other affected countries if United States is targeted or disproportionately affected).
310. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,248 (1991) (stating that "Congress
has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States"); see
also supra Part M1I (detailing applicability of various bases of jurisdiction to computer viruses);
supra notes 281-309 (explaining reasonableness of assertion of jurisdiction by United States).
311. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (maintaining that
"Acts of Congress normally do not have extraterritorial application").
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Therefore, for a law to function outside of the United States, Congress must
intend for it to do so.3" 2
The 1994 Act does not specifically mention the extraterritorial effect.3"3
The general rule when a statute makes no explicit mention of extraterritorial
effect is to look at the "text, structure, and legislative history" of the act.
31 4
However, an exception to this rule for criminal offenses that are as easy to
commit abroad as they are to commit within the United States exists.3"5
Because of the widespread use of the Internet, computer crimes commonly
cross national boundaries." 6 If fraud," 7 racketeering, 1" distribution of
narcotics, 19 and theft of U.S. property,32° all of which normally involve
physical elements, have extraterritorial effect, then computer crime laws,
which are generally nonphysical and do not rely on the proximity between the
perpetrator and the victim, should apply extraterritorially.321
Even if computer crimes do not fall within the exception, the 1994 Act
still operates extraterritorially because the text of the statute prohibits trans-
mission of data that would advantage a foreign nation.322 If data residing in
the United States is going to advantage a foreign nation, some action will most
likely occur outside of the United States.3" The explicit mention of a foreign
nation within the statute is strong evidence of the extraterritorial reach of the
312. See United States v. bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 193 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that
"[i]t is equally well-established... that courts are to presume that Congress has not exercised
[extraterritorial] power... unless Congress manifests an intent to reach acts performed outside
United States territory").
313. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994) (failing to mention territorial boundaries of statute).
314. bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 193.
315. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922) (stating that there is limited
exception for "criminal statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality").
316. See Landler, supra note 8, at Cl (explaining that iloveyou virus rapidly spread
worldwide).
317. See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 102 (giving extraterritorial effect to fraud statute).
318. See United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 839-41 (9th Cir. 1994) (deter-
mining that jurisdiction over violent crimes in aid of racketeering applies extraterritorially).
319. See United States v. Larsen, 952 F.2d 1099, 1101 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that
narcotics law applies extraterritorially).
320. See United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 1984) (allowing
extraterritorial application to statute criminalizing theft of United States property).
321. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (noting non-physical nature of computer
crimes).
322. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(aX1) (1994) (criminalizing transmission of data that "could be
used ... to the advantage of any foreign nation").
323. The data must get from the United States to the foreign government in order to
advantage the foreign government, and it is likely that some or all of that activity will occur
outside of the United States.
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statute. In addition, the statute mentions interstate and foreign communica-
tion?24 If a foreign communication is intercepted in violation of the statute,
then it is likely that the underlying criminal activity occurred abroad, which
is further evidence that the authors of the 1994 Act intended it to apply
extraterritorially. Therefore, the text of the 1994 Act supports an extraterrito-
rial interpretation.325
In addition to the text, the history of the statute indicates that it acts
extraterritorially.326 A government survey of businesses showed that over fifty
percent of respondents identified foreign competitors as potential computer
intruders and twenty-two percent identified foreign governments as potential
computer intruders."V Furthermore, the news media hyped the danger posed
by hackers both inside and outside the United States.32 Ample evidence
exists that the public and Congress had concerns in the early 1990s about
computer crimes that originated outside the United States.'"
In summary, it is as easy to commit a computer crime from outside the
United States as from within, thus the 1994 Act is extraterritorial because it
prohibits activities that fall within an exception to the normal rules of interpre-
tation.3 Even if the 1994 Act does not fall within that exception, the text and
history of the 1994 Act support the conclusion that Congress meant the 1994
Act to apply extraterritorially 31 Therefore, Congress must have enacted the
1994 Act with the intent to prosecute both domestic and foreign offenders
because computer crimes are so easily perpetrated from abroad.
324. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(aX2XC) (1994) (stating that conduct is illegal if it "involved
an interstate or foreign communication"); id. § 1030(aX7) (explaining that transmission through
foreign commerce of threat to damage computer violates Act).
325. See supra notes 322-24 and accompanying text (determining that text of statute
supports extraterritorial application).
326. See infra notes 327-28 and accompanying text (noting that history of statute supports
extraterritorial application).
327. See Hedich Nasheri & Timothy J. O'Heam, Crime and Technology: New Rules in
a New World, 34 CRiM. L. BUL... 520, 524 (1998) (citing survey administered by Computer
Security Institute).
328. See Richard C. Hollinger & Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, The Process of Criminalization:
The Case of Computer Crime Laws, 26 CRIMINOLOGY 101,107 (1988) (stating that "during the
late summer and fall of 1983, the media began to fixate on the prospect of young computer
hackers creating international mayhem"); see generally STOLL, supra note 5 (chronicling
activities of German hackers in 1987 who attacked some four hundred military computers).
329. See supra notes 327-28 and accompanying text (detailing historical factors that
support extraterritorial application of 1994 Act).
330. See supra note 315 and accompanying text (noting exception to general rule of
interpretation).
331. See supra notes 322-29 and accompanying text (explaining that text and history of
1994 Act support extraterritorial application).
1543
59 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1507 (2002)
V Conclusion
Computer viruses threaten our increasingly technological society. 32
Traditionally, the United States recognized jurisdiction based solely on the
territorial principle.33 However, expansion of the U.S. view on jurisdiction
over the last one hundred years has allowed U.S. laws to reach activities
committed by aliens while they are outside of the United States.334 Moreover,
the rest of the world now accepts the view that laws are not strictly
territorial. 5 In addition, widespread use of the effects and protective princi-
ples validate their use under international law. 36
The 1994 Act prohibits computer crimes that affect the United States,
regardless of the nationality or residence of the perpetrator. 37 Because of the
nature of computer viruses and the substantial effect they have on the United
States, it is reasonable for the United States to exert jurisdiction over persons
who release computer viruses that have a substantial effect in the United
States or that target an instrumentality of the U.S. government.3 However,
the United States is limited to cases in which the perpetrator acted from a
country without appropriate computer crime laws3 39 Computer criminals can
no longer use states without effective computer crime laws as modem-day
hideouts to avoid prosecution.
332. See Lacter, supra note 217, at 46 (noting damages caused by computer viruses); supra
notes 16, 20 and accompanying text (estimating damages from Melissa and iloveyou at $80
million and $10 billion respectively).
333. See BROWNLIE, supra note 49, at 300 (stating that "English and American
decisions... suggest that the territorial principle is exclusive").
334. See RESTATEMENT (TIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNTED STATES § 402
(1987) (detailing alternative bases for jurisdiction to prescribe).
335. See supra Part M (outlining international acceptance of various extraterritorial bases
ofjurisdiction to prescribe).
336. See supra Part MA-B (noting general acceptance of effects and protective principles).
337. See supra Part IV.B (arguing that 1994 Act applies extraterritorially).
338. See supra Part IVA (explaining that extraterritorial jurisdiction is reasonable in virus
cases).
339. See supra note 279 and accompanying text (noting that there is no conflict of laws in
such situations).
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